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PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE CIVIL JURY: CAN
REALITY BE FOUND IN THE ILLUSIONS?
Michael J. Saks*
There are certain times when public opinion is the worst of all
opinions.1
The private citizen, beset by partisan appeals for the loan of his Pub-
lic Opinion, will soon see, perhaps, that these appeals are not a com-
pliment to his intelligence, but ... an insult to his sense of evidence.2
The greatest challenge of writing this paper is to try to say some-
thing more complete, more thoughtful, or more illuminating than Va-
lerie Hans already has in her chapter on the same subject, published
only a few years ago.3
If I may oversimplify for a moment: In summary, the survey results
Hans examined suggested that the public's views of the civil jury were
less than sanguine, 4 especially on the question of awarding damages,
which by a ratio of about 3:1, respondents in one major survey
thought were "excessive" rather than "not enough. ' 5 What little addi-
tional data have been gathered since her review do not reveal that
those dim views of the civil jury have reversed direction.
I will take advantage of having been invited to discuss "illusion and
reality" about the civil jury to offer a skeptical view of what useful
knowledge such survey results can provide us about the institution of
the civil jury. Undoubtedly there is a place for public opinion re-
* Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of Iowa.
Ph.D., Ohio State University; M.S.L., Yale Law School. This article was written while the author
was a visiting professor at the Arizona State University College of Law. Thanks are due to Kim
Holst for research assistance.
1. Sdbastien-roch Nicolas de Chamfort, 1 MAXIMS AND CONSIDERATIONS No. 92 (1796).
2. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 401 (1945).
3. Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 248, 248-81 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). For more on this subject, see Edith Greene et
al., Jurors' Attitudes about Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
805 (1991).
4. Hans offers a somewhat more positive interpretation of the public's views of the jury than I
see in the same data. See Hans, supra note 3, at 275.
5. Id. at 257 (discussing results from a 1986 survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates
for Aetna Life and Casualty).
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search in social science and the law, 6 but I question how informative it
is on the subject of evaluating the institution of the jury.7 My sugges-
tion is that these survey results are deeply illusory. These results tell
us less about the allegedly sad state of the institution of the civil jury
and more about the arguably sad state of polling, public misinforma-
tion about the civil justice system, the public disinformation cam-
paigns of interest groups that expect to profit from certain changes in
the civil justice system, and the state of news reporting which-by the
nature of its selection of what is news and by its gullibility in passing
along as truth the press releases of some special interest public rela-
tions firms-fosters public misinformation on this subject.8 But I am
getting ahead of myself.
As attitude and opinion researchers well know, if asked for answers,
people can and will give responses on subjects about which they know
absolutely nothing. For example, a recent poll asked members of the
public if they thought extra-terrestrials were of greater or lesser intel-
ligence than earthlings.9 Forty-seven percent of respondents said they
thought that extra-terrestrials were more intelligent; 13% thought
they were less intelligent; and 40% thought extra-terrestrials and
earthlings were "about the same." 10 Of course, even if every earthling
thought extra-terrestrials were more intelligent, nothing is revealed
about the relative intelligence of extra-terrestrials. But the fact that
an extra-terrestrial has not yet even been interviewed on a talk show,
much less been given an IQ test, does not stand in the way of ob-
taining responses to an opinion survey on the subject.
Similarly, the public's belief that litigation is too frequent, justice
too infrequent, awards too large, and so on, is not the same as learning
something about the justice system. Here, then, is our first major
6. Shari Seidman Diamond, Legal Applications of Survey Research: The Legal Relevance of
Survey Research, § 5-1.0, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF Ex-
PERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
7. I do not mean to imply that Hans took these expressions of opinion at face value. Indeed,
she took some pains to try to put the responses in context so that readers could understand their
(more limited) meaning. Hans's ultimate conclusion was that the public supported the institu-
tion of the civil jury, while finding fault with the ability of jurors to make certain decisions,
especially the awarding of damages. Hans, supra note 3, at 261.
8. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
9. More precisely, the question about intelligence was put to the 60% of respondents who
believed that extra-terrestrials exist. But no doubt most of those who did not believe extra-
terrestrials existed still would have been willing to opine on ET's intellectual prowess. The sur-
vey was conducted by the Marist Institute for Public Opinion at Marist College, Poughkeepsie,
N.Y., and was released in December, 1997. These survey findings were reported widely in the
press. See, e.g., Robert Cooke, Life Out There? Majority Think So, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1997, at
A35.
10. Id.
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problem: Public beliefs reflected in poll results are sometimes mis-
taken as being evidence bearing on the reality of the phenomenon at
issue, rather than being merely statements of belief by people who
may have no idea what they are talking about. If nothing else, we
should not mistake one kind of information for the other.1' A unani-
mous public, certain that juries award "too much," adds nothing to
our knowledge of whether or not juries award too much.
Indeed, I am tempted to go further: Such opinion survey findings
tell us only what members of the public think they think about some
issue. Were they asked how confident they are about their answers to
these questions, or asked to consider the foundation on which their
answers are based, respondents might readily concede that their opin-
ions about the stupidity of juries and courts are built on a base not
much sturdier than the one that supports their beliefs about the bril-
liance of extra-terrestrials. I suspect that in the face of real informa-
tion about extra-terrestrials or the civil justice system, respondents
would cheerfully revise their views.
This is not to say that citizens are virtuosos when they are jurors,
but fools when they are survey respondents. It suggests only that peo-
ple do the best they can to answer the questions put to them, in reli-
ance on their available knowledge. As survey respondents, what do
they know about the IQs of extra-terrestrials or data on the perform-
ance of civil juries? Not much. As jurors, what do they know about
the facts of the case presented to them? Quite a lot. The point is
simply that jurors are in a better position to decide on the questions of
liability or damages of the case before them (having heard the evi-
dence, arguments, applicable law) than people who are considerably
removed from the trial. It would be remarkable indeed if those who
know far less or nothing at all about a body of thousands of cases were
more likely to reach a sensible judgment about the individual cases
and the aggregation of cases, and consequently about the institution of
the civil jury.
In the sections that follow, I try to reflect on the value and meaning
of survey findings on opinions about the civil jury. I will not set out in
the text the findings of these surveys on which I will comment.
Rather, I refer the reader to other summaries of them, 12 or to the
selected findings which appear in the Appendix accompanying this
article.
11. If you doubt that commentators on the justice system actually make this mistake, see
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation Sys-
tem-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1163 & nn.38-40 (1992).
12. See Greene et al., supra note 3; Hans, supra note 3.
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THE PARADOX OF THE PUBLIC'S OPINIONS ON JURIES
The one finding already mentioned above-that by a ratio of about
3:1 respondents thought juries made awards that were "excessive'" 13 -
suggests an interesting paradox. Citizens, in the role of respondents,
judge that a more or less equivalent group of citizens, in the role of
jurors, routinely make awards that are higher than the respondents
think is correct.' 4 By damning their fellow citizens, the respondents
are in effect damning themselves, because citizens serving as survey
respondents are no different from their fellow citizens serving as
jurors. 15
For the moment, put aside the fact that the respondents have no
idea what amounts of damages are awarded in response to the evi-
dence of injury and loss in the great run of cases, or perhaps, in any
cases at all. Why would the respondents not assume that two similar
groups of citizens (themselves and the jurors) would behave the
same? Or why not assume that if we were in their place, we would see
things pretty much as they see them? One essential idea of the jury,
after all, is that they are representative of the rest of us. Would a
group of judges selected at random assert that they give generally
longer (or shorter) sentences than the larger population of colleagues
from whom they were drawn? Or a randomly selected group of teach-
ers that they give generally lower (or higher) grades than the larger
population of their colleagues? Is this not a bit like assuming that two
groups drawn at random will be different? Or that a few spoonfuls of
the soup taste different from the rest of the soup in the bowl?
A more refined possibility is that survey respondents assume that
juries are not selected in a representative way, and that the people
who wind up on juries tend to be the less able members of the com-
munity. First, it is doubtful that the public at large has much idea
about who serves on juries. Second, as the one-day-one-trial system
13. Hans, supra note 3, at 257.
14. Perhaps I should say: would think is correct-if they knew what the awards were.
15. If the difference is that citizens as jurors in court are subject to the manipulations of law-
yers, we should not overlook that citizens as survey respondents are vulnerable to other manipu-
lations. Indeed, the latter manipulations may be more powerful and more pervasive. See the
discussion of persuasion techniques available to trial lawyers versus to others in society, in
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Deci-
sions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 1, 20-30 (1997). Moreover, the manipulations of lawyers in
court are amenable to prompt and vigilant correction by the opposing side, or structurally
through changing rules of evidence and procedure. For example, one of the most potent tech-
niques for influencing damages is simply to suggest to jurors what a party thinks an injury is
worth. Assertion of an ad damnum amount can simply be prohibited, as some states have. See
14 A.L.R. 3D 541, 558 (1998); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 860 (1988).
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of jury selection 16 spreads across the country, any discrepancy be-
tween the eligible community and those serving as jurors diminishes.
If this is the source of the survey responses, the responses grow in-
creasingly obsolete as the one-day-one-trial system advances.
One likely possibility, of course, is that there is a systematic bias,
such that we assume that we do better than others, especially when
the question is put to us as individuals, and the awards we are asked to
evaluate were made by a group of people. In fact, there are numerous
areas of belief and opinion where this kind of systematic bias has been
observed. Most businesspeople have been found to view themselves
as more ethical' 7 and more competent 18 than the average businessper-
son. Most employees regard their own job performance as superior to
that of their average co-worker.19 Most drivers, including those who
have been in serious accidents, consider themselves to be safer and
more skilled than the average driver.20 Most people think they are
more intelligent,2' healthier,22 less prejudiced,23 and observe all of the
Ten Commandments24 more than the majority of people in their com-
munities. In short, most of us do assume that we are above average.
If the same phenomenon is at work in these opinion surveys about
juries, we should discount the results as systematically overstating the
public's disapproval of jury decisions, and instead recognize them as
merely another example of the well documented "self-serving bias" in
public opinion.
An alternative interpretation of these survey responses is that they
do not reflect self-condemnation or mere above-averageness, so much
as they reflect chutzpa. To make such judgments about the decisions
16. A jurisdiction using a "one-day-one-trial" jury system requires citizens called for jury ser-
vice to serve only for a single day or, if chosen to sit on a jury, for a single trial. JURY TRIAL
INNOVATIONS § 11-2 (Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997).
17. RAYMOND BAUMHART, S.J., AN HONEST PROFIT 4-5 (1968); Steven N. Brenner & Earl A.
Molander, Is the Ethics of Business Changing?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 57, 64.
18. MORRIS ROSENBERG, CONCEIVING THE SELF 274-75 (1986).
19. Bruce Headey & Alex Wearing, The Sense of Relative Superiority-Central to Well-Being,
20 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 497, 497 (1988).
20. Bernard Guerin, What Do People Think About the Risks of Driving? Implications for Traf-
fic Safety Interventions, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 994, 1017-18 (1994); Ola Svenson, Are We
All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACrA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 143
(1981).
21. Laurie Larwood, Swine Flu: A Field Study of Self-Serving Biases, 8 J. App. Soc. PSYCHOL.
283 (1978).
22. Ruth C. Wylie, 2 THE SELF-CONCEPT: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SELECTED Topics 675-
76 (1979).
23. David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J. EXPTL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 480,
497-99 (1985).
24. Roger Rosenblatt, The 11th Commandment, FAM. CIRCLE, Dec. 21, 1993, at 30, 30.
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of our fellow citizens requires us, as respondents, to think that we-
with no evidence about the particulars of the case and without benefit
of the applicable legal instructions-can nevertheless make the judge-
ment that our fellow citizens (who, as jurors, do have the benefit of
that particularized information) generally get it wrong. Implicit in this
judgment, of course, is the assumption that we would make the award
lower and get it right, while they made it higher and got it wrong.
One of the most likely explanations for this paradox is the publicity
given to assertions that the civil justice system is "spinning out of con-
trol," giving exorbitant awards, and so on.25 The average citizen hear-
ing this is faced with a dilemma. If the charges laid against juries are
correct, then they implicate all citizens who are represented on juries.
There are only two escapes from being guilty of such mis- or malfea-
sance. Either there must be credible counter-evidence and counter-
arguments to the charges-but the mass media carry little or none of
these. 26 Or we ourselves must join in the condemnation of those per-
verse jurors-even if the line between them and us is invisible.
If the preceding paragraph does contain the explanation for these
paradoxical survey results, then it is quite a tribute to those who have
waged the campaign against the civil jury, because the challenge has
been nothing less than to convince members of the public that they
themselves are incompetent and irrational. It would appear that the
effort has succeeded. 27
25. The various charges made against juries are reviewed in STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995); Saks, supra note 11. The phrase "spinning out of
control" was one of former Vice President Dan Quayle's favorite ways of describing the civil
justice system. See, e.g., Henry J. Reske, Presidential Policies and the Law, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992,
at 66, 70 (1992) (quoting Dan Quayle).
26. Interest groups assert these charges and supportive anecdotes or data with abandon. The
media repeat them credulously. Rejoinders showing that many of the anecdotes and much of the
data are distortions or falsehoods are deemed not newsworthy. And the interest groups con-
tinue offering the uncorrected "evidence." For a discussion of such anecdotes, see Saks, supra
note 11, at 1159-62. Also see the American Tort Reform Association's web site, <http://
aaabiz.com/atra/ath.htm>, which as of this writing continues to have a section devoted to casu-
ally gathered anecdotes, called Horror Stories: Stories That Show A Legal System That's Out of
Control. One advocate repeatedly presented misleading data, but the data were camouflaged on
repetition, so that the data became harder to unmask. See Saks, supra note 11, at 1164-66 &
nn.42-46.
27. Polls dating from before the mid-1980s also reflected a belief that jurors were not very
good at deciding damages. See infra Appendix, Gallup 1982. So this is not a recent
phenomenon.
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ATTITUDES WITHOUT INFORMATION
Much like answering questions about the intellectual capabilities of
little green aliens from space, when survey respondents are called
upon to answer survey questions about juries, courts, or the law of
torts or damages, they know little about those topics. Were we to ask
respondents to provide some harder estimates of the behavior of the
tort litigation system, including the behavior of juries, we would be
likely to find them as ill-informed as my own law students, who, dur-
ing the first week of class, filled out questionnaires showing that they:
* overestimate by a factor of more than eleven the amount of
money that is returned through the tort system to victims of non-
fatal injuries;28
" overestimate by a factor of ten the proportion of medical mal-
practice injuries that result in filed claims;29 and
" think that only fifteen people die from medical accidents for
every 100 who actually do.30
The fact that opinions about the justice system do not depend heav-
ily on knowledge about the justice system has been amply demon-
strated in various contexts. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc.31
compared the views of members of the public in states that had under-
gone extensive court reform and those that had not, and found no
differences.32 Word spreads slowly about whether reform has even
occurred, and the details of such reforms spread more slowly, if at all.
For example, nearly a decade after parole was abolished in the federal
system, my incoming law students remained largely oblivious to such a
dramatic change.33
One study found that even during a period of high (one might say
frenzied) interest in tort reform, not only average citizens, but even
those who were deeply concerned about the debated reforms-legisla-
tors, attorneys, and physicians-were in considerable error about ba-
28. Their median estimate was $80 billion. The actual figure is around $7 billion. DEBORAH
R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 31
(1991). The total loss to be compensated is $176 billion. Id. at 52.
29. Their median estimate was that claims are filed for about 50% of malpractice injuries,
while the actual proportion is closer to 5%. PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRAC-
TICE 62 (1993).
30. Their estimate was 22,000 deaths. The best available data put the figure at around 150,000
deaths. Id. at 55.
31. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Highlights of a National Survey of the General Public,
Judges, Lawyers, and Community Leaders, in STATE COURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 5
(Theodore J. Fetter ed., 1978).
32. Id. at 9.
33. In 1994, 78% of my class of first year law students thought that parole still existed in the
federal corrections system.
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sic empirical facts regarding the functioning of their own state's tort
system (grossly over-estimating the incidence of litigation and the size
of awards). 34 The good news, perhaps, is that those who truly needed
to know, namely, members of the legislature's judiciary committees,
did have the most accurate information.35
If the public's knowledge were as far off the mark as these data
suggest, how much confidence should be placed in their opinions that
rest on such knowledge? Put differently, if the public had accurate
information-instead of no information, vague impressions, or clearly
erroneous information-how might their beliefs and opinions about
the jury change?
Survey results suggest that the public feels that, in general, judges
have more knowledge and are better qualified to apply the law, 36 par-
ticularly when it comes to applying the law in cases requiring the
weighing of difficult issues.37 The public is especially dubious about
the ability of average citizens-as compared to judges-to assess the
proper amount of damages, 38 perhaps especially non-economic dam-
ages. No doubt the task is a difficult one. Jurors hunger for more
guidance than the law gives them. 39 Survey respondents think jurors
would benefit from more guidance from judges.40 But respondents
must be assuming that there is more guidance to be given (and in be-
lieving that, reveal further ignorance about the law's goals and
methods).
What might happen if respondents learned that the reason lay ju-
rors were asked to determine the amount to be awarded for general
damages was that the law recognizes the absence of markets for such
losses; that consequently there was an absence of any "objective" gui-
dance on the value to be placed on such losses; and that the best sub-
stitute for the values that would be provided by such a market that
34. Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on
Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REV. 585, 586-89, 603 (1988).
35. One can still worry about whether a political decision-maker can stand up to pressure
applied by the mass of the misinformed, armed only with accurate knowledge. Or stand up to
those who know better, but who also know that it is in their own interest to continue to insist
that the sky is falling. See Special Issue, A Dialogue on Tort Litigation in the States: The Wil-
liamsburg Report, 18 ST. CT. J. (1994) (summarizing the proceedings of a conference at which
corporate executives declared that data about the legal system were not relevant to the asserted
problems of the tort system, but that anecdotes were).
36. See infra Appendix, Zuger 1983.
37. Joe C. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Tri-
als, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 733-44 (1991).
38. See infra Appendix, Harris 1986; infra Appendix, Public Pulse 1991.
39. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases:
Problems and Possibilities, PSYCHOL. PUB. POt'Y & L. (forthcoming 1999).
40. See infra Appendix, Harris 1987.
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anyone could think of was the community's estimate of the value of
such losses? 41 A sample of the community-the jury-is in a better
position than any other decision-maker to say what these losses were
worth. I suspect that if survey respondents were better appraised of
the nature of the problem, they would have a more sober assessment
of the law's solutions, and would be less Pollyannaish about the possi-
bility that a judge could provide a better answer than the jury.
PUBLIC BELIEFS VERSUS ACTUAL DATA ON THE TORT SYSTEM
Are the beliefs commonly expressed by the public in national polls
accurate? If the beliefs underlying the attitudes are not accurate,
should that not affect our view of the resulting attitudes? How well
are the most widespread beliefs about the civil justice system sup-
ported by empirical data about the system? Even a fleeting acquain-
tance with the relevant literature 42 suggests that a wide gap separates
the public's stereotypical beliefs about its civil justice system and its
own role as jurors in that system, from the empirical facts about the
system. 43
Litigiousness:
Myth: There are too many frivolous suits; Americans sue at the slight-
est provocation.44
Data: Every study that has examined the question has concluded that,
except for automobile accidents, only a small percentage of
those who could properly bring a claim for an actionable injury
in fact do so. 45
Pro-Plaintiff Bias:
Myth: Jurors are biased in favor of plaintiffs, out of sympathy toward
victims of injury, while judges are much less prone to finding
liability.46
41. See George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 103, 109 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); see also Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of
Age: Will the System Survive?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 876, 877-79 (1989) (concerning the non-mar-
ket problem); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compen-
sation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INrr'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203-04 (1988) (same).
42. Much of that literature is reviewed in DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 25; VIDMAR, supra
note 25; Saks, supra note 11.
43. Indeed, the loudly asserted claims of tort reformers, and the resulting widely held beliefs
of the public, have been the fuel propelling the dispute processing research industry within the
law and social science world.
44. See infra Appendix, Hans 1991.
45. See Saks, supra note 11, at 1183-86 (reviewing these studies).
46. See infra Appendix, Zuger 1983.
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Data: The most prominent study of jurors and judges found that on
the question of liability in personal injury cases, judges and ju-
rors agreed on liability in 79% of cases, with neither being more
favorable to plaintiffs or defendants in the cases on which they
disagreed. 47 More recent research on federal civil trials sug-
gests that in most types of cases there is no difference between
judge and jury findings, though in the most publicized cases,
namely medical malpractice and product liability, judges appear
to be more favorable to plaintiffs than juries are.48
Excessive Compensatory Awards:
Myth: Jurors give awards that are too large, and certainly larger than
the awards given by judges or other experts.4 9
Data: More than a generation ago, Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel
found that although judges and jurors made decisions that were
indistinguishable on liability, jurors made awards that were
about 20% higher than those made by judges.50 More recent
research has found that jury awards undercompensate plain-
tiffs' actual economic losses by a considerable margin;51 that in
the most controversial categories of cases, plaintiffs will do bet-
ter in front of judges than jurors;52 that professional compensa-
tion boards make awards that are considerably higher than
those made by the juries they were invented to replace;53 and
that jurors and arbitrators make remarkably similar awards. 54
Punitive Damages:
47. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063-68 (1964).
48. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiri-
cism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1126 (1992).
49. See infra Appendix, Metricus 1991; infra Appendix, PUBLIC PULSE 1991; infra Appendix,
Harris 1987.
50. Kalven, supra note 47, at 1065.
51. E.g., ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUD-
IES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 248-52 (1964); JAMES K. HAMMIT, AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: PAYMENTS BY AUTO INSURERS 45-46 (1985); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET
AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 86-95 (1988).
52. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 1126.
53. Eleanor D. Kinney & William P. Gronfein, Indiana's Malpractice System: No-Fault by Ac-
cident?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 1991, at 169, 190-91.
54. The jurors' awards, however, tend to be smaller. See Michael Brady & Peter Cubanske,
The Judicial Arbitration System: Its Promise and Its Shortcomings, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 1993,
at 29, 30; Neil Vidmar & J.J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 884 (1993).
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Myth: Juries award punitive damages routinely and in amounts that
are far too high.55
Data: Every empirical study of the question has failed to find any dra-
matic increase (or even much increase) in the frequency with
which juries impose punitive awards, and the amounts awarded
do not appear to have grown out of proportion to the harm
done and seem to be an amount reasonably calculated to pun-
ish the particular wrongdoer 5 6
In light of large divergence between public belief on these matters
and the best available data, what should one make of the resulting
public opinion?
SOURCES OF THE PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE
Where do members of the public gain their understanding of the
institutions they are asked by public opinion surveys to judge? We
cannot justifiably expect members of the public to go out and conduct
their own systematic empirical studies to help them form their views.
We cannot even expect them to read the research literature. We can,
however, justifiably expect members of the public to offer opinions of
their institutions based on their personal experiences. But it turns out
that few respondents report that personal experience with jury service
is the source of their beliefs and opinions-only 6% said so in one
national poll;57 in another, only 23% of respondents had served as
jurors.5 8 If we could disaggregate the data and compare what those
who served as jurors had to say compared to those who had not
served, we are likely to discover that the former have quite different
and far more positive views of the justice system they served in, the
role they played, and the quality of the work they did when they were
jurors.59 For example, 81% of former jurors say that if they were in-
55. See infra Appendix, Yankelovich March 1995; infra Appendix, Public Pulse 1991; see also
Vice President Danforth Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, Address Before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1991), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 984 (1992) ("Today ...
plaintiffs in civil lawsuits routinely ask juries to award ... punitive damages. And juries are
responding with enthusiasm.").
56. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 25, at 237-38; MARK A. PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 12, 17 (1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New
Light on Punitive Damages, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33, 36; Michael Rustad, Demysti-
fying Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases: A Survey of a Quarter Century of Verdicts
(Papers of the Roscoe Pound Found. 1991).
57. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., supra note 31, at 9, 19 tbl.I.14.
58. See infra Appendix, Yankelovich January 1995.
59. See Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens
Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 287.
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volved in litigation, they would be confident in submitting their own
cases to a jury.60
The single most important source of knowledge about the civil jus-
tice system, survey respondents say, is the news media, which surely is
not unexpected. 61 If the news media are the source of such knowl-
edge, and the basis of opinions, we can justifiably expect them to pro-
vide accurate information to the public about the performance of the
public's institutions. How well do the media do? The news on the
news is not comforting. Daniel Bailis and Robert MacCoun's content
analysis of several major publications reveals that their choice of sto-
ries to report systematically distorts the impression created of the
types of cases that are litigated and the outcomes of the cases, espe-
cially the amounts awarded.62 Surely this, too, is not unexpected.
Who wants to write about one more fender-bender settled for a few
thousand dollars? But how is the public going to acquire a more com-
plete and representative picture of the workings of the legal process,
and learn enough so they would not be surprised to learn that 80% of
automobile accident cases were resolved for damages involving less
than $15,000? How is the public to learn the larger reality, and not
only about the highly filtered, shocking, and amazing cases that are
the preferred reportage?63
A year ago I put this question to experienced journalists enrolled in
a graduate journalism course I was invited to address. I presented the
findings of Bailis and MacCoun's content analysis, and juxtaposed
them against the best available data describing the actual workings of
the litigation system. I asked if there were not a way to inform the
public of the overall typical, tamer, actual picture, in addition to the
shocking and outrageous. They nearly unanimously responded by
saying that the individual stories were the news, and the "trend" arti-
cle I was implicitly advocating was: (a) not news; (b) not of interest to
many readers; and (c) therefore not worth publishing.
I also submitted to several publishers a prospectus of a book that
Neil Vidmar and I plan to write. The contemplated book would syn-
thesize all of the best, most complete, and accurate empirical research
60. Id. at 286 (citing Joyce E. Tsongas et al., The Ninth Circuit Courts: A View from the Jury
Box (1986) (unpublished manuscript)).
61. Yankelovich, Skelly & White, supra note 31, at 19 tbl.I.13.
62. Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks With the Media as Your
Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64, 64-67 (1996).
63. For an analysis and interpretation of the organized campaigns to make the civil justice
system more favorable to defendants, see Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence
and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269.
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on the behavior of the tort litigation system. I approached several
publishers who had published misleading polemical works whose aim
it was to convince the public that the civil justice system is a major
disaster.64 If they published in this area, I reasoned, they might want
another book on the subject, albeit with a contrasting conclusion.
One editor wrote back, explaining their lack of interest: The kind of
book you propose is what we call "the Bermuda Triangle explained,"
and we do not publish those. That is, while readers will buy books
telling them the sky is falling, they do not buy as many books that
calmly explain the data and show that nothing so catastrophic is really
going on after all. I wrote back and acknowledged that they were in
the business of selling books, rather than providing truth to the public.
But, I asked, if the preferences he described to me were invariably
followed, how was the public ever going to acquire the knowledge it
needs in order to live in the real world and have an informed under-
standing of their institutions? He responded with a compromise.
They might publish our book, but only if we put a spin on it to con-
demn the justice system for the opposite disaster-that is, that it fails
to meet the needs of litigants by being inaccessible and under-vigilant,
and that it under-deters, and under-compensates. 65
Beyond unrepresentative reporting and a sky-is-falling book pub-
lishing ethic, there are the systematic public relations efforts of lobby-
ists waging war on the existing civil justice system. Press conferences,
advertising campaigns, organizations formed to "reform" the civil jus-
tice system, and so on, have been created and paid for by those inter-
ests that feel they can raise their profits by effecting certain changes in
the civil justice system. 66 The problem is not so much that we should,
or can, expect these interest groups to neutrally inform rather than to
strongly advocate on behalf of themselves and their clients. 67 They
64. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
65. All of that is much closer to the truth.
66. For example, consider the millions of dollars spent promoting the agenda of tort reform,
advanced by ATRA, the Manhattan Institute, and various other such organizations. See DAN-
IELS & MARTIN, supra note 25, at 24-26 and sources cited therein.
67. For example, on being asked to respond to a review of relevant empirical data on the
existence of a litigation explosion, which found little evidence of one,
Martin F. Connor, president of the Washington, D.C.-based American Tort Reform
Association, agrees that data is difficult to obtain, especially at the state court level.
However, he has little use for reports such as this. "There's always somebody writing
an article like this," he says. "I think all of this is just show biz." He says that there is
no relationship between the tort reform movement and the perception or reality of a
litigation explosion. "We're concerned with the efficiency and fairness of the American
justice system," he says. "We don't sit here counting lawsuits."
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have a right to lobby and persuade and, perhaps, even to mislead, in
order to reduce their expenditures and thereby increase their profits.
The problem is that no effective countervailing information source ex-
ists to present the actual data, or even equal and opposite
prevarication.
Ironically, when the media take a breather from regaling the public
with stories of the litigation system "spinning out of control, .... individ-
uals suing everyone in sight whenever the slightest thing goes wrong,"
they report the "tragedy of medical errors," the "outrage of growing
neglect" of patient needs driven by managed health care or of harmful
products-and then rail against the legal system for failing to act to
keep those latter problems in check.
The effects of the disconnect between public beliefs and legal sys-
tem reality are perhaps most clearly illustrated by studies of criminal
sentencing. When a sample of citizens is asked if they think the
sentences meted out by judges are too harsh, too lenient, or about
right, a large percentage of respondents say "too lenient. ' 68 By con-
trast, when asked what sentence they feel is the "appropriate sen-
tence" for a given type of offense and offender, on average they
specify a sentence that is less than that which judges already give.
How can the public regard judges as too lenient if the judges impose
sentences that are longer than the sentences that the respondents
think are proper? This paradoxical state of opinions results from ab-
stract and superficial opinions unconnected from concrete details. Its
consequence is that sentences can spiral ever upward, as legislatures
and judges continually ratchet up penalties in response to public opin-
ion seeming to show public dissatisfaction with the leniency of
sentences. But no amount of increase in sentences will be enough,
Ken Myers, Professor's Study of Tort System Finds No "Litigation Explosion," NAT'L L.J., Sept.
7, 1992, at 4, 4.
68. See ANTHONY N. DOOB & JULIAN V. ROBERTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC'S VIEW OF
SENTENCING 10-11 (1983); Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Public Punitiveness and Pub-
lic Knowledge of the Facts: Some Canadian Surveys, in PUBLIC ATrITUDES TO SENTENCING:
SURVEYS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES 111, 111-13 (Nigel Walker & Mike Hough eds., 1988); Julian V.
Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on Public Views of Sentencing, 14 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 451, 460 (1990) [hereinafter Roberts & Doob, News Media Influences]; Loretta J.
Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sen-
tencing: Misperception and Discontent, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 199-202 (1990). For exam-
ple, 67% of those surveyed in an Illinois study believed that persons convicted of residential
burglary received sentences that were too lenient. Id. at 206. When asked what their own sen-
tence for residential burglary would be, however, only 11% or 26% (depending upon the form of
the question) suggested a sentence that exceeded the minimum that convicted burglars actually
spent in prison in Illinois. Id.
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because the public's platitude that "judges are too soft" is uncon-
nected to actual sentencing behavior.
COMPARED TO WHAT?
Good researchers, including survey researchers, know that mean-
ingful answers rarely come from measuring absolute levels of any vari-
able but usually come only from comparisons. Thus, it is not enough
to know what the public thinks of juries. To understand what those
opinions really mean, we need to compare them to other opinions,
such as what the public thinks of comparable institutions. If the public
holds executive and legislative branches of government, and judges,
the press, corporate management, and managed health care in equal
or lower regard than the jury, then we know, in a comparative sense,
what the public's estimation of the jury is.
Alternatively, instead of comparing attitudes toward different insti-
tutions, perhaps we should compare what citizens think of their own
skills in the role of jurors to what they think of their own skills in
other significant life tasks, such as making decisions on child-rearing,
health care, and financial planning.
The conclusions and actions that seem to be urged upon us based on
public opinion about juries should be tempered by findings about the
public's opinions in other areas. Are we urged to severely restrict or
abolish judges and legislatures, corporations, and managed health
care? Or substitute experts for family members as the ones who can
best make child-rearing, health care and financial decisions?
Another source of comparison is what other "publics" think of ju-
ries. Perhaps most notably, Hans reports that "[a]ll the surveys of
judges' attitudes toward the civil jury show virtually unanimous sup-
port for the institution. ' 69 Why do judges think so much more highly
of juries than the public at large does? Perhaps it results from judges
having the advantage of comparing their own judgments about a case
with the verdict returned by the jury. When they find the juries' ver-
dicts usually are the same as, or not unreasonably different from, their
own, they find validation not only in their own thinking about the
cases, but in the jury as well. We might wonder what the public would
think of the jury if it could observe them as judges have the opportu-
nity to observe them.
Or, in contrast to public opinion, perhaps we should compare the
performance of juries to other legal decision-makers. One comparison
is provided by Kalven and Zeisel's American Jury research, showing a
69. Hans, supra note 3, at 262.
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considerable degree of similarity between the conclusions of juries
and those of judges.70 More recent surveys of judges find that judges
continue to regard jury decisions as highly similar to their own in the
large majority of cases.71 Recent research on the precise question of
deciding pain and suffering awards finds striking similarities between
the decision processes of jury-eligible citizens, judges, and lawyers in
their perceptions of injuries and their efforts to translate these percep-
tions into dollar awards. 72 We might wonder what the public would
think of the jury if it were informed of such empirical findings that
indicate a considerable degree of equivalence between these differing
factfinders.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF OPINION AND BELIEF SURVEYS
Self-report surveys have important strengths and amusing weak-
nesses. They can provide estimates of an infinite variety of behavior
far more easily and cheaply than can be obtained by trying to directly
observe the behavior of interest. 73 They can provide as direct a mea-
sure as any imaginable for some questions, such as who consumers
perceive the maker of a product to be (for the purposes of trademark
litigation).74 Note, particularly in the last example, that what the re-
spondents typically are asked to do is examine some object and state
their perception of and inferences about it right then and there. 75
But survey respondents also give systematically misleading answers
in a variety of contexts.76 Answers can be shaped by the form and
content of the questions used to elicit the answers. Questions that
resemble bumper sticker slogans and fail to probe for reasons or test
the knowledge base can elicit responses that hide more than they un-
cover. Memories become distorted. Socially desirable, rather than
70. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-65 (1966); Kalven, supra note
47, at 1064.
71. See Ellen L. Rosen, The View from the Bench: A National Law Journal Poll, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 10, 1987, at S1.
72. These findings are from a study conducted by Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart, and my-
self, under a grant from the National Science Foundation, about which we are in the process of
writing an article.
73. For example: How many walks do people take in a year? You can ask a sample for an
estimate or you can have researchers follow people around for the year.
74. See BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL & DAVID C. HILLARD, TRADEMARKS (1987).
75. This should strike the reader as resembling the present sense impression exception to the
hearsay rule, suggesting that it is the sort of situation where self-report survey research is consid-
ered to be particularly good hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(1).
76. See discussions of these problems in EARL BAnBIE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (1973);
FLOYD FOWLER, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (2d ed. 1993); HANDBOOK OF SURVEY RE-
SEARCH (Peter H. Rossi et al. eds., 1983); SEYMOUR SUDMAN & NORMAN BRADBURN, RE-
SPONSE EFFECrS IN SURVEYS (1974); Diamond, supra note 6, § 5-4.0.
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true, answers are offered. And survey respondents are notoriously
poor at prognosticating about their own behavior, as many disap-
pointed marketing researchers have discovered. Respondents also are
willing to offer opinions about that which they know little or nothing.
Giving opinions comes remarkably easy to all of us, especially when
the stakes and consequences at least appear to be zero. I have little
doubt, however, that if an identical sample was formed into a legisla-
tive committee with the responsibility to convert their opinions into
policy actions, they would proceed more cautiously. They would try
to inform their opinions before arriving at them and before acting on
them.
Where, in this spectrum of situations from the least to the most
valid surveys, do opinions about legal institutions, such as the jury, fit
in? The question practically answers itself. If this paper is a critique of
anything, it is a critique of loosey-goosey, quick-and-dirty surveys that
reveal only the most superficial and poorly considered impressions of
respondents, and then are offered to the public as though they were
meaningful statements about what that public thinks about its own
institutions, or worse, meaningful statements about the institutions
themselves.
Imagine that survey questions such as the following were given to a
representative sample of the public, instead of the questions provided
in the Appendix.
1. Who do you think would be a better factfinder in a complicated
case between two high technology corporations: A judge who
took as little math, science, and business as possible and still
managed to graduate from college, or a dozen citizens of varied
backgrounds (perhaps an electrician, an accountant, a math
teacher, an engineer, an assembly-line worker, etc.)?
2. What amount of money should be paid to the innocent victims of
others people's negligence: An amount calculated to compensate
each individual's losses? Or an arbitrary amount set in advance
by the legislature?
3. Granted that it is not really possible to put a dollar value on the
ability to see or walk or have a baby, who do you think is in the
best position to guesstimate the worth of such losses: A judge?
A poet? A doctor? A bureaucrat? The collective judgment of
the entire community? The collective judgment of a sample rep-
resenting that community?
4. What amount of money would you want from someone in ex-
change for granting him or her permission to put out your eyes,
cripple you, or burn your face unrecognizably?
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5. When a person or company knows it is doing something danger-
ous that has a high potential to hurt people, but it goes ahead and
does it anyway and causes serious physical harm to people, what
should be the law's response to that injurer? Should the law
have a set fine unrelated to the extent of wrongdoing? Or should
the punishment fit the crime?
I do not argue that these are the most probing or the most fair ques-
tions one could ask citizens about the tort system, though I think they
are no worse, and perhaps are better than many that are asked. But
even if they are no better than the usual sorts of questions asked, that
fact in itself demonstrates that the existing questions are not likely to
produce much real knowledge and may be pre-ordained to lead to
responses that damn the tort system and the jury's role in that system.
ACTOR-OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS
When people who served as jurors are asked why they decided a
matter as they did, they tend to explain their decisions in terms of the
characteristics of the evidence and arguments placed before them.77
When we ask observers of juries-or of judges-why those decision-
makers decided a matter as they did, the observers tend to explain the
decisions in terms of the characteristics of the decision-makers. 78 Ac-
tors make external attributions (that is, to the situational surround);
observers make internal attributions (that is, to the attributes sup-
posed to inhere in the decision-maker). 79 The more remote the ob-
server, the more superficial the view, the more internal the
explanatory attributions.80
One relevant demonstration of this phenomenon is found in some
of Anthony Doob and Julian Roberts' other research about public
opinions of judges' sentencing.81 On being shown a brief news clip-
ping about a judge's sentence in a case and asked to evaluate the pro-
77. The reader is invited to ask anyone who has served on a jury to explain why he or she
personally chose the verdict. The answer will focus on the evidence and the law presented at the
trial, not the juror's attitudes, personalities, demographics, etc.
78. Examples are provided in Neil Vidmar, The Unfair Criticism of Medical Malpractice Juries,
76 JUDICATURE 118 (1992).
79. Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions
of the Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR (E.E. Jones
et al. eds., 1972).
80. This is not to say that survey respondents do not recognize the absence of basic tools of
factfinding when asked about them. In one survey, 79% of respondents endorsed a reform al-
lowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses, and 90% favored allowing jurors to take notes. See
infra Appendix, Yankelovich January 1995. Nevertheless, respondents do not think of situa-
tional factors when asked in the abstract what they think of the performance of juries; rather,
they think of jurors.
81. Roberts & Doob, News Media Influences, supra note 68, at 451, 460.
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priety of the sentence, most respondents regarded the sentence as
being far too lenient. On being shown progressively more complete
descriptions of the facts of the case and the offender, ctilminating in a
statement that reflected all of what was in the pre-sentence report on
which the actual trial judge based the sentence, more and more re-
spondents evaluated the sentence to be more and more appropriate.
In other words, the closer the respondents came to knowing what the
judge knew, the more they agreed with the judge's sentence.
Thus, as the knowledge of opinion poll respondents approximates
that of the juries concerning the cases those juries decided, presuma-
bly the greater would be the degree to which the respondents would
agree with the decisions made by the juries in those particular cases-
though, paradoxically, the respondents still would make a very differ-
ent judgment about cases in the aggregate.
THE LIGHTNING ROD THEORY OF JURIES
The intense focus on juries is in itself somewhat peculiar. After all,
in civil cases, jury verdicts are, as a practical matter, little more than
advisory opinions. A jury's verdict in a civil case, regardless of its di-
rection, can be set aside; the award can be increased or decreased by
the trial judge or by a court of appeals; and the award is subject to
continuing negotiation by the parties as they await the trial court's,
and then the appellate court's, response to post-trial motions and ap-
peals. It follows, then, that if the civil justice system has problems,
juries are the least of them, because obviously erroneous decisions
made by juries can easily be set right by judges.
Perhaps public opinion about the jury is an indication that the light-
ning rod theory is working. That theory is that the jury exists in part
to draw public ire to itself and away from judges. Judges are perma-
nent fixtures of courts. If a judge makes an unpopular decision, public
hostility to him or her, and to the judiciary as a whole, can linger and
grow, eventually damaging the judicial process itself. But juries are
temporary and fluid. They make their decisions and fade back into
society. And jurors are the citizens themselves. What better sign of
the success of this jury function than finding that the public is so un-
happy with juries and has so much confidence in judges that it wishes
that fewer decisions were made by juries and more by judges?
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Jurors are thought to be inconsistent and irrational.82 No doubt
they sometimes are, or at least seem to be. No doubt judges would
eventually be viewed by the public as inconsistent and irrational83 if
juries were not there as the lightning rods to protect the judges. What
appears in the surveys to be a "problem" may actually be a measure of
the jury's success in its lightning rod function. Were the public's eter-
nal displeasure with juries translated into eventual abolition of the
jury, very soon no one would be more distressed by that turn of events
than judges.84
If we put together the fact that judges usually agree with jury deci-
sions and voice strong support of juries, with the survey data showing
widespread public complaints about juries and not about judges, it is
hard not to conclude that, at least as lightning rods for judges, juries
are working quite well.
. CONCLUSION
We have been reflecting on the views of juries as expressed in pub-
lic opinion surveys. Negative public opinion about the jury is para-
doxical, because those condemning juries in opinion surveys are
sampled from essentially the same population from which juries are
drawn. How can the public's judgements in the latter role be so
wrong, and their judgments in the former role be so right? The public
is ill-informed about major aspects of the behavior and performance
of juries in the tort litigation system; the known empirical facts of jury
behavior contradict, to a considerable extent, the beliefs about juries
expressed in public opinion surveys. The public's knowledge is not
based on direct experience, but results mainly from exposure to the
news media. News media reports have been found to present a highly
unrepresentative (read: distorted) picture of the cases that come to
court and how juries decide them.85 Are the results of public opinion
82. Reviews of sources asserting that juries are inconsistent and irrational can be found in
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 25; VIDMAR, supra note 25; Saks, supra note 11. See Daniels,
supra note 63.
83. They already are by those who read large numbers of judicial opinions.
84. Perhaps that is one of the reasons that judges show so much stronger support for juries
than the general public does. Recall that, "[a]ll the surveys of judges' attitudes toward the civil
jury show virtually unanimous support for the institution." Hans, supra note 3, at 262.
85. The reported cases do exist-at least sort of. See supra note 26 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that sometimes cases reported in the news are described in highly distorted fash-
ion). The implication is that it is not unreasonable for citizens to evaluate the system based on
those reports of what they believe to be real cases that were badly decided. But does it really
make sense to condemn a whole system based on a handful of aberrant cases? Can we sensibly
judge those cases one way (judge them to be wrongly decided) and to judge the overall system a
different way (judge it to be functioning sensibly)? Perhaps the system works well for a large
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polls about the jury teaching us something about the sad state of the
jury as an institution? Or the sad state of public knowledge about the
institution? Or misleading news reporting? Or about the success of
campaigns to "reform" the civil justice system?
On the one hand, uninformed and speculative beliefs, reflected in
the received "public opinion" of surveys, are not the reality of the
matter under examination. On the other hand they are a reality of
sorts: what people believe is true often drives policy more than what is
actually true. For example, public attitudes toward judicial sentencing
in the abstract drive sentences upward, even though we also know that
the public's sentencing recommendations in particular cases or catego-
ries of cases often are lower than the sentences already being meted
out and served.
On the other hand, in terms of "bottom lines," it is easy to find
public opinion support for improvements in the decision-making situ-
ation of the jury and hard to find support for outright abolition of
juries.86 Interestingly, then, despite the ready acceptance of unsup-
ported summary criticisms, people seem conservative enough to reject
the radical "solution" of abolishing the jury.
We pay attention to public opinion out of democratic habit. Yet
public opinion can be manufactured by those who believe that achiev-
ing their corporate goals involves changing the law governing liability
and trial procedures; that changing the law requires public support;
and that such support can be obtained through media manipulation.
Fortunately for those interests, the way the media report news pro-
vides a natural assist to the development of poorly informed and su-
perficial opinions. And, also fortunately for them, major national
opinion polling is conducted in a way that taps superficial opinions
and imbues them with the appearance of substance.
If public opinion matters-and in a democracy it surely does-we
as a society must find better ways to better inform that opinion. And
majority of cases, but it cannot adequately deal with a small number of unusual cases. Or must
we condemn any system that is not adapted to the extremes with which it will be confronted-
much as biological organisms are adapted to the extremes of their environments? If the latter, I
wonder if we will begin to close hospitals because of the 1% of cases that result in malpractice
injuries? Or close corporations because some of their products proved to be harmfully defec-
tive? Or end the insurance industry because of instances of bad faith? In the criminal justice
system, we have lately discovered in a dramatic way that erroneous convictions for very serious
crimes are a very real problem. See CONNORS, LUNDREGAN, MILLER & MCEWEN, CONVICTED
BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO Es-
TABLISH INNOCENCE AFrER TRIAL (1996). Why not avoid these dreadful mistakes by abolishing
trials? Why would it make sense to be intolerant of one of these areas because of its shortcom-
ing, but tolerant of the others despite their serious shortcomings?
86. See infra Appendix, Yankelovich January 1995.
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to be more serious about measuring that opinion in ways that are
more meaningful and revealing. A more constructive approach might
be to ask the public about its goal and value preferences with respect
to its legal institutions-what ought they accomplish? And then use
empirical data on the performance of those institutions to test the ex-
tent to which they are meeting those goals. This would be a more
meaningful way to take public opinion seriously, while not being mis-
led by it.87 The alternative of throwing aside, or radically altering, our
legal institutions on the strength of opinions based on nothing is not a
particularly wise, or even a sane, approach to making legal policy. 88
87. "Where mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the
true functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis,
of the capacity to govern." WALTER LIPPMANN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY § 4 (1955).
88. None of this is to say that the jury system does not have real flaws that deserve real
repairs. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Effects of Bifur-
cating Claims for Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297; Michael J.
Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1997). But
solutions can be found that are tailored to the problems. We should prefer fine tuning and
constructive innovation to the meat axe.
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APPENDIX
ATTITUDES TOWARD JURIES:
SELECTED PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY RESULTS
1982 Gallup-Gallup Where the amount of Good idea: 46%
Organization (1982), damages sought Bad idea: 38%
available in Westlaw, exceeds $20,000, do
ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. you think it would be a
OPINION RES., good idea or a poor
Question ID: idea if the person or
USGALLUP.1201. company being sued
n=1519 were to have the right
to ask that the case be
decided by a panel of
three judges rather
than by a jury?
1983 Zuger-MARTIN Judges thought to have Agree: 62%
ZUGER, PUBLIC more knowledge and
ATrITUDES TOWARD be better qualified to
CIVIL JUSTICE (1983). apply the law
Does plaintiff have a Jury: 52%
better chance of Judge: 16%
winning if the
factfinder is a judge or
a jury?
1986 Tsongas-Joyce Former jurors who Yes: 81%
E. Tsongas et al., The would be confident in
Ninth Circuit Court: A submitting their own
view from the Jury Box cases to a jury [if they
1986 (unpublished were involved in
manuscript, results litigation]
described in Shari
Seidman Diamond,
What Jurors Think:
Expectations and
Reactions of Citizens
Who Serve as Jurors, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993)).
n=1186
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1987 Harris-Louis
HARRIS & ASSocs. ET
AL., PUBLIC ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
TORT LAW SYSTEM
(reporting survey
conducted for Aetna
Life and Casualty Co.
by Louis Harris &
Associates in March of
1987).
n=2008
Does the civil justice
system enable those
who have been injured
to obtain adequate
compensation from
those responsible?
Yes: 75%
Size of awards Excessive: 45%
About right: 28%
Not enough: 16%
Among reasons for the A major reason: 56%
increase in the "overall A minor reason: 31%
cost of lawsuits":
"juries which hand out
awards that are too
big"
Having the judge give Very acceptable: 39%
the jurors specific Somewhat acceptable:
guidelines about how 34%
much in damages
should be awarded in
cases of a particular
type
After a jury has Very acceptable: 29%
decided a lawsuit, Somewhat acceptable:
having the judge- 33%
instead of the jury-set
the amount of damages
awarded
1991 Hans-Valerie P. "[T]here are far too Agree: 91%
Hans, Attitudes Toward many frivolous lawsuits
the Civil Jury, in today"
VERDICT: ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 259 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993).
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1991 PUBLIC PULSE- Cap awards for Agree: 70%
To Sue or Not to Sue? punitive damages
Public Backs Liability
Reform, PUB. PULSE,
Aug. 1991, at 6.
Cap awards for lost Agree: 50%
income
Cap awards for pain Agree: 67%
and suffering
Cap awards for medical Agree: 47%
expenses
1991 Metricus-Jeanne Juries today are Agree: 68%
J. Fleming & Leonard awarding too much
C. Schwarz, Juror money
Opinion Survey Reveals
Obstacles for Litigators,
INSIDE LITIG., Dec.
1991, at 21.
n=500
Yankelovich, January Proposed reform: Right direction: 79%
1995-Yankelovich Allowing jurors to ask Wrong direction: 15%
Partners & Talmey- questions during trial
Drake (Jan. 1995),
available in Westlaw,
ROPER CTR. FOR PUB.
OPINION RES.,
Question ID:
USYANKP.95TORT.
n=1001
Proposed reform: Right direction: 90%
Allowing jurors to take Wrong direction: 5%
notes during trial
Have you ever been on Yes: 23%
a civil jury? No: 77%
Yankelovich, March Proposed reform: Favor: 61%
1995-Time, CNN, & Limiting the amount of Oppose: 34%
Yankelovich Partners punitive damages a
(Mar. 1994), available jury can award in civil
in Westlaw, ROPER cases to $250,000
CTR. FOR PUB.
OPINION RES.,
Question ID: US
USYANKP.040395.
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